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Acquired mirroring and intentional 
communication in primates
Abstract: Arbib offers a coherent proposal of how the brain has evolved to be-
come language-capable. Integral to the argument are mirror neurons, cells dis-
covered in macaque brains with interesting firing patterns, and studies on ges-
tural communication of great apes. Here, I first discuss some complexities of the 
recent mirror neuron literature, which suggest that ‘mirroring’ may be an onto-
genetically acquired, not an evolved, feature of neurons. Second, it is now clear 
that chimpanzee vocal behaviour is strongly mediated by social variables, and 
that individuals can use vocalisations to persuade and inform others, facts that 
have implications for gestural theories of language evolution. I conclude with dis-
cussing research most needed for making progress in understanding how human 
language has evolved.
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1 Introduction
The evolution of language is often considered one of the hardest problems in sci-
ence, and Michael Arbib is to be congratulated for putting forward a coherent 
story of how the human brain, the organ of language, could have evolved to be-
come language capable. To understand its evolution, human language is perhaps 
best investigated as a collection of independent mechanisms with their own evo-
lutionary histories. One way to make progress in this direction is by carrying out 
comparative studies that involve non-human primates, and Arbib makes ample 
use of primatological findings to advance his arguments. He follows a frame-
work proposed by Hockett (1960), who has compiled a list of components that 
characterise language. Arbib’s list contains 11 key properties, including complex 
action recognition and imitation, intentional communication, symbolisation, 
parity, displacement, and so on. An added feature is that, throughout the book, 
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Arbib is trying to convince the reader that the emergence of mirror neurons was 
a  key evolutionary event towards language-capability, so this deserves special 
attention.
2  Mirror neurons: acquisition or inheritance?
Some cells in macaque brains respond to both observing and executing the same 
practical actions, such as grasping a peanut, and for this reason they have been 
named ‘mirror neurons’. A rich interpretation of this neurobiological phenome-
non is that mirror neurons do not just simply wire and fire together; they are not 
just intersections of motor and perceptual pathways, but play a governing role in 
cognition, for example by affording ‘action understanding’ and imitation (e.g. 
Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), yielding first person insights into the inten-
tions and goals of others (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011), enabling theory of mind 
(Gallese and Goldman 1998), and, crucially, are required for language (Rizzolatti 
and Arbib 1998). Mirror neurons, in short, are the neural mechanism under-
lying  a number of complex cognitive processes, many of which define human 
uniqueness.
Although these proposals have had much impact and intuitive appeal, I per-
sonally remain unconvinced that mirror neurons have done much in terms of ad-
vancing our understanding of language evolution, for a number of reasons. First, 
according to a recent review (Cook 2012), mirror neurons do not always mirror so 
well, but respond to similar, related, or even different actions in the observation 
and execution condition, with only a minority responding selectively when the 
subject observes and executes an action. Although firing rates can increase in 
both the observation and execution condition, they can also both decrease, or 
increase in one and decrease in the other condition (Mukamel et al. 2010).
Equally relevant is that ‘mirroring’ may not be a hardwired property, but 
a feature that can be acquired by a cell during ontogeny. This distinction is im-
portant because the current belief has been that mirror neurons are a species-
specific property of some brains, with a tacit assumption that natural selection 
has favoured their evolution because of adaptive benefits in cognition. However, 
if mirror neurons are the result of ordinary learning processes, for example be-
cause visual and motor representations of actions are predictive of one another, 
then they should be found in response to any arbitrary event, provided the re-
quired contingencies are in place (Cook 2012). This hypothesis has some appeal if 
one considers that some of the actions tested with macaques involved ‘unnatural’ 
human artefacts (plastic crumbling, plier movements) instead of ecologically 
more relevant events as encountered by free-ranging macaques. If mirror neurons 
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are not the product of natural selection, but an acquired general feature of brain 
circuitry, then it is difficult to see why they should be given a privileged position 
in theories of language evolution (Heyes 2010).
Third, the best evidence for mirror neurons is still from single cell recordings 
in macaque brains, but these are primates that neither have language nor particu-
larly impressive imitation abilities. Although it is likely that humans (and great 
apes) also have mirror neurons, it is less clear what we should conclude if mirror 
neurons turn out to be a general feature of vertebrate brains. For humans, Muka-
mel et al. (2010) recorded extracellular activity of cells in the medial frontal and 
temporal cortex while patients executed or observed hand grasping actions and 
facial emotional expressions. A significant proportion of neurons responded to 
both observation and execution of these actions, but a subset of these neurons 
showed excitation during execution and inhibition during observation, further 
suggesting that the current view of mirror neurons is too simplistic.
It is somewhat regrettable that Arbib does not address the current mirror neu-
ron literature in its full complexity, particularly the key issues of ontogenetic flex-
ibility and action specificity. As a result the reader is left with more questions and, 
in my case, remains unconvinced that mirror neurons should be granted a special 
place in the evolutionary theory of the language capable brain.
3  Primate communication and human language
Biologically, humans are primates, most closely related to chimpanzees and 
bonobos, with a shared common ancestor 7–8 million years ago, according to a 
recent estimate (Langergraber et al. 2012). Members of the genus Homo start ap-
pearing in the fossil record around 2 million years ago, while modern humans are 
only a few hundred thousand years old, a very short time period for major evolu-
tionary transitions to occur. The key components of the human language faculty, 
in other words, are unlikely to have evolved ‘ex nihilo’ in such a short time, so 
what were the relevant precursors?
Arbib’s scenario is that language evolved in two stages. Manual-based proto-
language came first, followed by a vocal-based protolanguage that came second. 
In support, Arbib discusses the fact that humans gesture when speaking, some-
thing that is also observed in blind people, while deaf people develop gestural 
communication in the absence of auditory input. Opponents of gesture-first theo-
ries typically argue that this scenario is non-parsimonious because it requires two 
major evolutionary transitions, one from vocal to gestural and a  second one from 
gesture to speech. The alternative is that speech has evolved directly from vocal 
communication, with gestures playing a subsidiary role throughout.
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There is some hope that primate communication research can move this de-
bate forward. Studies on gestural communication in great apes have shown that 
gestures are common during play (e.g. Pika et al. 2005), sexual solicitation 
 (Hobaiter and Byrne 2011) and intergroup encounters (Herbinger et al. 2009). 
What is also well established is that great apes take into account the attentional 
state of their recipients when producing gestures, a fact that has been given spe-
cial status in support of gestural theories of language evolution (Tomasello 2008).
Less clarity exists on what actually should count as a gesture. As a result, re-
corded repertoire sizes can vary dramatically, even within the same study group. 
For example, Hobaiter and Byrne (2011) discriminated more than 60 gestures 
in the Sonso chimpanzee community of Budongo Forest, Uganda, while Roberts 
et al. (2012) only found half as many, a reflection of methodological differences. 
Hobaiter and Byrne (2011) have chosen the typical approach in gesture studies, 
which is to record any body or limb movement with no obvious physical effect, 
but then to exclude those that do not pass “strict criteria for intentionality”  (Genty 
et al. 2009), which typically leads to excluding around 50% of observations. The 
contentious point here is that the intentionality criteria used to exclude behav-
iour are all based on subjective observer judgements. Roberts et al.’s (2012) ap-
proach has been somewhat more objective in that the supposed gestural signals 
were identified by their physical structure before relating them to eliciting con-
text and recipient responses, which resulted in a much smaller repertoire.
So far, research on ape gesture has spectacularly failed to provide evidence 
that these signals convey anything about the external world, apart from the sig-
naller’s desire to engage in a particular activity, typically to play, have sex, or 
persuade a recipient to move. Also, there is little evidence that gestures are 
 conventionalised signs that have been acquired as part of a cultural process. Pan-
tomiming is conspicuously absent, apart from isolated anecdotes, and idiosyn-
cratic gestures are typically seen in captive apes interacting with humans, sug-
gesting that they are instrumentally conditioned responses that have been 
acquired in the context of feeding.
Nevertheless, Arbib favours the ‘gesture first’ scenario and part of his strat-
egy  is to discount primate vocal behaviour as irrelevant for questions of lan-
guage  evolution. In his view, primate vocalisations are not used intentionally 
“to  influence the behaviour of specific others” (p. 74), while chimpanzees are 
“unable to suppress calls” and “vocal communication may not involve the 
caller’s assessment of the recipient’s knowledge”. However, my reading of 
the current primate literature is that these points need to be revised, as there is 
good evidence for persuasion, inhibition and provision of information in great 
ape vocal communication. I will review some of the relevant evidence in the fol-
lowing  sections.
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3.1 Persuasion
In a study with wild chimpanzees, victims of social aggression produced acous-
tically distinct victim screams with a graded structure that reflected the na-
ture of the attack experienced by the victim (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 2005). 
But in  addition, the acoustic structure of these screams was further affected 
by  the composition of the nearby audience: if victims were with other indi-
viduals who outranked the attacker, then they tended to produce screams shifted 
towards the severe end of the acoustic spectrum, as if trying to persuade these 
powerful bystanders to intervene on their behalf (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 
2007).
Other evidence is from the foraging context. When encountering food, chim-
panzees often produce specific, acoustically graded vocalisations, the so-called 
‘rough grunts’. Depending on the type of food encountered, the acoustic structure 
of these calls varies, broadly reflecting the caller’s personal food preference 
 (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 2006). However, callers are significantly more likely 
to produce ‘rough grunts’ if they travel with ‘friends’, i.e. group members with 
whom they have strong grooming relationships compared to ‘non-friends’ 
 (Slocombe et al. 2010), suggesting that the decision to call largely depends on 
whether callers are with someone they want to feed with.
3.2 Inhibition
Contrary to what Arbib writes there is very clear evidence that chimpanzees can 
suppress calls, usually if they assess a social situation in an unfavourable way. 
For example, during sex females regularly, but not always, produce copulation 
calls. Calling frequency is independent of a female’s identity or social position, 
but strongly determined by the rank of her male partner. With low-ranking males, 
females consistently suppress their copulation calls, in contrast to when copulat-
ing with a high-ranking male. In addition, females are significantly more likely to 
suppress calls if surrounded by large female audiences, while the size of the male 
audience has no effect (Townsend et al. 2008). The most likely explanation for 
such vocal inhibition is that females seek to minimise aggression. For instance, 
when caught copulating with low-ranking males females can be attacked by a 
high-ranking male. Similarly, there is considerable hostility between female 
chimpanzees (Townsend et al. 2007), suggesting that females seek to disguise 
their sexual behaviour from other females.
Inhibitory effects on vocal behaviour are also observed in other contexts, 
such as when low-ranking individuals encounter higher-ranking group members. 
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In the typical case, the lower-ranking individual produces a vocal ‘greeting’ sig-
nal, a so-called ‘pant grunt’, which facilitates peaceful interactions between the 
two, despite their rank differences. However, if the alpha male is in the vicinity, 
lower-ranking individuals are significantly less likely to greet high-ranking indi-
viduals, despite everything else being equal (Laporte and Zuberbühler 2010), pro-
viding further evidence that chimpanzee vocal behaviour is under considerable 
social control.
3.3 Informing
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence for arguments about language evo-
lution concerns the question of whether non-human primates are capable of ac-
tively informing others about events in the world. Passive informing certainly ex-
ists in the form of recipients making inferences about the event type encountered 
by a caller, and Arbib acknowledges this fact. In the classic case, free-ranging 
vervet monkeys produce acoustically distinct alarm calls to different predators 
and recipients respond to these calls as if having spotted the corresponding pred-
ator themselves, for instance by running to cover when hearing another monkey’s 
‘eagle’ alarm call (Seyfarth et al. 1980). However, a monkey calling in response to 
an  eagle may do so regardless of the state or composition of its audience.
Although predator-specific alarm calling has now been described for a range 
of primate and non-primate species (Zuberbühler 2011), such studies do not usu-
ally address whether the caller wishes to inform his audience about the event it 
has just perceived, or whether the calls are mere readouts of an underlying psy-
chological state triggered by the event. In other words, the monkeys may simply 
communicate what they experience internally, without considering or including 
the composition and knowledge of their audience.
Although the final verdict is still out, a number of studies with monkeys have 
suggested that callers can be ‘audience-aware’ to various degrees. In one case, 
wild Thomas langur males were observed when alarm calling to a tiger model. 
The striking finding was that the males continued to alarm call until every group 
member had responded with at least one alarm call, as if trying to ensure that all 
group members were aware of the danger (Wich and de Vries 2006). Similarly, in 
a playback experiment male blue monkeys produced significantly more alarm 
calls if some of their own group members were close to a suspected predatory 
eagle compared to when the group was further away, while the calling male’s own 
distance to the eagle had no effect (Papworth et al. 2008). Adult male primates 
often play an important role in protecting others from predation, which may ex-
plain their altruistic vocal behaviour in the presence of dangerous predators.
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More directly relevant is a recent field experiment with wild chimpanzees. 
In this study, members of the Sonso community in Budongo Forest, Uganda, en-
countered a model of a dangerous viper. In response, individuals produced spe-
cific alarm calls (‘alarm hoos’), but call production was significantly influenced 
by whether or not they were with group members who already knew about the 
snake. Again, this was independent of the caller’s own experience with the snake, 
suggesting that chimpanzees take the knowledge state of their audience into ac-
count when producing warning calls (Crockford et al. 2012: Figure 1).
It is important to remember that the vocalisations investigated in these stud-
ies are part of a species-specific behavioural repertoire; they are not equivalent to 
speech signals. The calls will develop and appear in an animal’s vocal repertoire, 
regardless of whether it happens to grow up in Uganda or the Ivory Coast. In hu-
mans, the basic speech units, the phonemes, are equally hard-wired but their 
combinatorial use is culturally acquired. What the primate studies show is that 
non-linguistic vocalisations are governed by psychological experiences, perhaps 
similar to what underlies and governs linguistic communication. Of course, it is 
Fig. 1: Wild chimpanzees take into account their audience before vocalising to persuade others 
or inform them about relevant events (Photo Florian Möllers)
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not possible for a chimpanzee to explain to another what it had for breakfast, 
or on which tree it spent the night, but it can indicate the location of food, in-
form  others about danger, or choose to remain silent if social conditions are 
 unfavourable.
4 Conclusion
Arbib must be congratulated for his ambitious project in trying to advance our 
understanding of how evolution made one primate brain capable of highly com-
plex communication, language. What makes Arbib’s approach different from 
other recent work on the same topic is that he is willing and able to discuss and 
review evidence from all levels of analysis, proximate mechanisms, ontogeny, 
biological function and phylogenetic history. How successful has he been with 
his mission?
It is natural that scholars differ in how they pick out empirical evidence when 
building their theories. Personally, I cannot get so excited over the fact that some 
cells in the macaque brain show interesting firing patterns, and the conceptual 
fabrications that have emerged from this. Maybe mirror neurons have emerged 
due to a chance mutation that has been favoured by natural selection because of 
enhanced cognitive abilities. However, the more typical case is that natural selec-
tion acts on entire organisms that are already well adapted to their current envi-
ronments. I therefore find it more probable that mirror neurons are a natural bi-
product of large brains, something that emerges ontogenetically as individuals 
learn how the world works.
In my opinion, progress on how the brain has become language-ready largely 
depends on two areas of research, the evolution of vocal control and the evolu-
tion of cooperative motivation. It is in these two areas where humans deviate 
most strongly from non-human primates. Whether one likes it or not, human lan-
guage is largely a vocal behaviour, the product of an unusual motor skill that 
 enables speakers to control their vocal tracts and its acoustic products in rapid 
and precise ways. In non-human primates, vocal tract control is only rudimen-
tarily developed, with little evidence of vocal learning and influence of ontoge-
netic experience (Fitch and Zuberbühler 2013), although the basic vocal tract 
anatomy is largely identical. One way to make progress and to address this co-
nundrum is to search for areas of enhanced vocal flexibility in modern primates, 
both within and between species and across functional contexts. For example, 
it has been found that vocal repertoire size correlates with social complexity in 
different primates (McComb and Semple 2005) suggesting that social evolution 
has been a main driving force towards enhanced vocal control. The sophisticated 
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vocal abilities of humans, according to this hypothesis, may have evolved due 
to  especially complex social problems. This idea is supported by the fact that 
 primate calls used in social interactions tend to be acoustically more variable 
than other calls. In great apes, acoustic gradation found in some calls has been 
linked with how individuals assess social situations (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 
2005).
Another source of flexibility arises when primates produce sequences of 
calls, which can sometimes lead to changes in meaning (Arnold and Zuberbühler 
2006; Ouattara et al. 2009), with some evidence also for great apes (Clay and Zu-
berbühler 2011). Although these phenomena are interesting, not enough material 
is currently available to decide whether primate call sequences are best described 
as a finite state grammar or whether they have basic hierarchical organisation, 
as is characteristic for human speech. It is also unclear how much control indi-
viduals have over sequence production and what role ontogeny and learning 
plays. Research is urgently needed in these areas.
A second major component of the language faculty, in my view, concerns the 
origins of the cooperative motivation that characterises human communication 
(Tomasello 2008, 2010). Unlike other primates, humans routinely base acts of 
communication on assumptions and knowledge that they share with receivers. 
The ability to take into account what information is novel and interesting for a 
receiver develops early in human infants, and may therefore not require advanced 
theory of mind abilities (Liebal et al. 2010). Primate communication and human 
language are thought to differ most fundamentally in this domain, although the 
demarcation between humans and primates appears to be fluid (Crockford et al. 
2012). Very little systematic work has been done and it is therefore not possible to 
decide how important the ability to take others into account is in non-human 
primate communication.
How did humans evolve such a profoundly different way of communication 
compared to other primates? A key event after the split from the common ancestor 
was probably the migration out of the forested habitat, the home of most non-
human primates, including all great apes. Survival and reproduction in the open 
savannah may have been more challenging for earlier humans due to predation, 
intergroup conflicts, and new demands in terms of cooperative breeding and for-
aging. Similar to meerkats and other social carnivores, the hominid response ap-
pears to have been to become hyper-social and hyper-cooperative. Equipped with 
an already very efficient communication device and high social skills, perhaps 
similar to what is seen in today’s chimpanzees and bonobos, early humans were 
well positioned to evolve more efficient communication, characterised by en-
hanced vocal control and by a cognitive apparatus able to cope with a highly co-
operative lifestyle.
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The last mile to human uniqueness and language, therefore, can probably 
not be understood by comparative studies with non-human primates, but may 
require other approaches, such trying to understand the function of the genetic 
changes that have make us uniquely human (e.g. Enard et al. 2002).
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